

Identity and Apocalyptic Terrorism

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Introduction

The events of 11 September 2001 taught us many things about ourselves, others, and the world we live in. We learned who and what was important to us, what it felt like to be victimized, and how developments in other countries could threaten our homeland. We also learned what it felt like to thirst for revenge. The experience has left us with a number of unanswered questions. To this day, we ask “why?” We have found there are no easy answers.

We are realizing that understanding the phenomenon of terrorism in general and apocalyptic terrorism in particular is one of the greatest challenges of the millennium. This chapter hopes to explain some of the unanswered questions by (a) examining the nature of today’s terrorism, (b) exploring some of its deep rooted causes and conditions, and (c) analyzing the relationship of apocalyptic terrorism with the basic human need for identity. Our goal is to encourage the reader to look beyond his or her own biases and historical assumptions -- to look beyond the symptoms and beyond the enemy images. Only then can we build an understanding of the underlying causes and conditions of terrorism. In the end, our understanding will contribute to the resolution of the problem.

Terrorism - a problem of definition

“While nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer,
nothing is more difficult than to understand him.”
Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky

Many scholars and social researchers agree that today’s terrorism is a complex problem with both diverse origins and individuals who engage in it (Reich, 1998:1). It has evolved and transformed itself along the years from since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the former Soviet Union to this day. From assassinations, to left-wing right-wing ideological war, to airline hijacking, and ethnic separatism, terrorists’ motivations, strategy, and weapons have changed. As Laqueur (1996) says, there is an increasing trend toward more indiscriminate killing, away from attacking specific targets (like in assassinations of high officials).

Contemporary terrorism is an upgrade of the old problem; it is more sophisticated and harder to detect due to its ambiguous nature. As Ian Lesser writes:

The old image of a professional terrorist motivated by ideology or the desire for “national liberation,” operating according to a specific political agenda, armed with guns and bombs, and backed by overt state sponsors, has not quite disappeared. It has been augmented -- some would say overtaken -- by other forms of terrorism. This new terrorism has different motives, different actors, different sponsors, and... greater lethality (1999:1).

So, how did terrorism evolve and what does its history tell us?

The word “terrorism” entered the vocabulary of European languages at the dawn of the French Revolution, and comes from the term “system (or rule) of terror” -- *regime de la terreur* -- as recorded by the Academie Française in 1798 (see Roberts, 2002). The “regime de la terreur” was an instrument of the state designed to consolidate the power of the newly-installed revolutionary government, protecting it from elements considered “subversive” (see Burgess, 2003). During the French Revolution, terrorism was viewed as a positive phenomenon. Robespierre viewed it as vital if the new French Republic was to survive its infancy, proclaiming in 1794 that “Terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country’s most urgent needs” (ibid.).

The phenomenon of terrorism, however, dates back much further than the French Revolution to the *Sicari* and the *Zealots*, two Jewish groups active during the Roman occupation of the first century Middle East. The Sicari murdered those (mainly Jews) they deemed apostate and thus selected for execution, whereas the Zealots targeted Romans and Greeks, sending a message to the Roman authorities and those Jews who collaborated with them (ibid.).

Then came the *Thugees*, an Indian religious cult active from the 7th until the mid 19th centuries. They ritually strangled their victims -- usually travelers chosen at random -- as an offering to the Hindu goddess of terror and destruction, *Kali* (ibid.).

In the 11th century the *Assassins* -- an offshoot of a Shia Muslim sect known as the *Ismailis* -- was born. Their victims were politicians or clerics who refused to adopt the purified version of Islam they were forcibly spreading. The Assassins’ deeds were carried out in broad daylight at religious sites on holy days -- a tactic intended to publicize their cause and incite others to it (ibid.).

The above historical examples show that terrorism was first religiously based, and re-emerged later during the French Revolution as a nationalist and an anarchist phenomenon. With the appearance of political ideologies, such as Marxism, terrorism grew secular and, according to Italian revolutionary Carlo Pisacane’s theory of the “propaganda of the deed,” recognized the need to deliver a message to an audience other than its immediate target and draw attention and support to a cause (ibid.) (one example that comes to mind here is the 1878 Russian Populist group, *Narodnaya Volya*).

State-sponsored terrorism dominated the period before, during, and after the two World Wars, a time of many political assassinations and totalitarian regimes, most notably in Germany, Italy, and Russia. At the same time, however, non-state “terrorist” groups were beginning to emerge especially in the wake of the World War II. In Kenya, Malaysia, Cyprus, and Palestine these groups learned to exploit the burgeoning globalization of the world’s media (ibid.). According to Hoffman, “they were the first to recognize the publicity value inherent in terrorism and to choreograph their violence for an audience far beyond the immediate geographical loci of their respective struggles” (1988:65).

Since then terrorism has taken many forms and has gone beyond state borders. It has become increasingly involved in attacking innocent civilians and sophisticated in weaponry and behavior.

Due to the changing nature of terrorism, we talk more of a psychological than a political and an ideological terrorism. To support this Martha Crenshaw writes, "It is difficult to understand terrorism without psychological theory, because explaining terrorism must begin with analyzing the intentions of the terrorist actor and the emotional reactions of audiences" (1998:247).

Social scientists continue to study the behavioral psychology of present and future-to-be terrorists to determine the "why" (i.e., motivations) of terrorism. By answering the "why" we go beyond the symptoms to addressing the root causes of the problem, thereby intervening to prevent further spread of terrorism.

Defining the eclectic phenomenon of terrorism remains the challenge of the 21st century. Current scientific literature has yet to provide a universally acceptable and comprehensive definition, one that is inclusive of psychological, political, ideological, theological, and conflict resolution theories. In this section, we will attempt to explore various theoretical definitions that, we believe, will help understand the many variables that shape terrorism.

Governmental definitions

As Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander write, "each agency or office of government has approached the problem of definition from its own point of view of responsibilities" (1986:21). Governments' first official attempt to define terrorism has been reflected in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Geneva, November 16, 1937). Twenty three signatories of the Convention defined terrorism as "criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons, or the general public (ibid., 23).

According to Cline and Alexander, each sovereign state determines what is and what is not terrorism in the context of domestic and foreign affairs (ibid., 24). For instance, between the 70s and the 80s Argentina was plunged into an obscure world of unspeakable human rights violations culminating with the "desaparecidos" (the disappeared persons) during the military government that followed the overthrow of Perón. This particular historical epoch loaded with political upheavals led Argentina to the definition of terrorism as a "fragrant violation of human rights" and "incompatible with the concept of human dignity" (Terrorism in Argentina, January 7, 1970, in Cline and Alexander). For France, terrorism was a "heinous act of barbarism" (Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN General Assembly, 28th Session, Supplement No.28, New York, 1973, in Cline and Alexander) and for Venezuela it was any act that "endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms" (excerpt from same Report). The definitional problem we see here would have been resolved if leaders of the most powerful states had assembled and collaborated long time ago on terrorism and strategies to prevent it (see Laqueur, 1996).

In the United States, governmental branches and agencies have offered their own interpretation of terrorism. Though with minor differences, official perspective on terrorism is evaluated on the "national interest" and "political realism" paradigms. This means that governments, especially Western governments, define terrorism by looking at its symptoms, not root causes or origins. If military force alone is employed to fight terrorism

and its symptoms, long-term governmental strategies on the war against terrorism will not be successful. Success depends on a multi-dimensional strategy, incorporating, in addition to military, political, economic, and social paradigms, conflict resolution that looks at the deep roots of terrorism and helps us understand the 'why' of a terrorist act.

Let us examine some of the official interpretations of terrorism.

In the context of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1984, Senator Jeremiah Denton, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee of the Judiciary, said:

... terrorism means the knowing use of force or violence against any person or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, territory, possession, or district, with the intent to intimidate, coerce, or influence a government or person in furtherance of any political or ideological objective" (Cline and Alexander, 1986:30-31).

In 1984, then U.S. Secretary of State Schultz called terrorism "a form of political violence... neither random nor without purpose":

... the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same. They are trying to impose their will by force -- a special kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear... they want people to lose faith in their government's capacity to protect them and thereby to undermine the legitimacy of the government itself, or its policies, or both. We must understand that terrorism, wherever it takes place, is directed in an important sense against us, the democracies -- against our most basic values and often our fundamental strategic interests (ibid., 32-33).

In the Army Regulation 190-52, the U.S. Department of Army defines terrorism as:

... the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims (ibid., 34).

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as:

... the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

The U.S. Department of State brands terrorism as:

... premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents, normally intended to influence an audience (Reich, 1998:262).

Whereas the U.S. Air Force provided the following in its RAND project:

... an act of terrorism [is] first of all a crime in the classic sense such as murder or kidnapping, albeit for political motives... terrorist tactics in most cases violate the rules that govern armed conflict... terrorism contains a psychological component -- it [is] aimed at the people watching.

In the above definitions, the common theme is that terrorism is branded a criminal act for mainly political and/or ideological motives, with huge psychological effects on the innocent. However, neither of these definitions touches upon the actors who commit terrorism, religious motives, deep causes of terrorism, or sees the outcome of terrorist acts as apocalyptic. While they are concise... simpler and easier to comprehend than the academic definitions (Cunningham, 2002:23), governmental interpretations lack a deep analysis of both “salient issues that make terrorism a distinct and illegitimate form of political violence” (ibid.), and particularly religious and psychological elements that affect people’s assumptions about terrorism.

As previously mentioned, terrorism changes its nature and the 21st century terrorism, such as the 9/11 attacks and the 1995 poison gas attack in a Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo, aims for bigger outcomes... fulfilling a religious commandment by killing all the “non believers,” the enemies of Allah, thereby bringing on the apocalypse. Apocalyptic terrorism, which will be dealt with later in this chapter, is on the rise due to today’s availability of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction including biological agents. If terrorist groups have already experimented with chemical agents, they may use, in the near future, biological ones with ease as well.

Non-governmental definitions

It is worth reiterating that terrorism is “notoriously difficult to define in part because it has evolved” (CSIS, MIT, 2002) and in part because it is a matter of perception. However, there are several academic definitions that are comprehensive and deserve our attention.

Ehud Sprinzak drew a definition of terrorism from an historical study of the “Weathermen” -- a small radical organization, operated in Chicago in the early 70s, that broke away from the less extreme U.S. antiwar movement to plant bombs in the Pentagon and elsewhere (see Walker, 2001). Sprinzak writes:

Terrorism is neither a *sui generis* plague that comes from nowhere, nor an inexplicable, random strike against humanity. Terrorism -- and ideological terrorism in particular -- is a political phenomenon par excellence and is therefore explicable in political terms. It is an extension of opposition politics in democracy, a special case of an ideological conflict of authority. It is, furthermore, the behavioral product of a prolonged process of delegitimation of the established society or the regime... the process does not involve isolated individuals who become terrorists on their own... rather, it involves a group of true believers who challenge authority long before they become terrorists, recruit followers, clash with the public agencies of law enforcement from a position of weakness, obtain a distinct collective world view,

and, in time, radicalize within the organization to the point of becoming terroristic. The terrorist collectivity is almost always an elite group that is headed by well-educated middle-class or upper-middle-class young people... (1998:78-79).

Sprinzak's detailed definition incorporates some important elements that governmental definitions lack in their interpretation of terrorism. In essence, Sprinzak's terrorism is a well organized act for political, not criminal, purposes. It places emphasis on the group rather than the individual, highlighting the fact that the terrorist group is comprised of well educated young individuals, not psychopaths, who put group (or, as Sprinzak says, collective psycho-political) identity above their individual identity. According to Sprinzak, it is at the last stage of group formation that group identity reaches its peak (ibid., 79). (The issue of identity and how it connects with terrorism, and apocalyptic terrorism in particular, is dealt with later in this chapter.) Crenshaw agrees saying:

Terrorism is not... the act of an individual. Acts of terrorism are committed by groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs... It is a political act performed by individuals acting together and collectively trying to justify their behavior (1998:250).

In her attempt to define terrorism, Martha Crenshaw is primarily concerned with psychological theory. In *Origins of Terrorism -- Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, she proposes research questions for students of terrorism as well as for psychological approaches. For instance, do researchers agree on dependent and independent variables of terrorism? How do we link psychological theory to research on terrorism, and what do we hope to achieve with this? For Crenshaw, terrorism "differs in level of violence, innovativeness, and choice of targets. The actors who use it are different. Its effectiveness varies" (1998:248). This variability may also be explained by the fact that, although terrorism is the act of a collectivity, "individual commitment to the group and its beliefs varies" (ibid.).

Beau Grosscup, another scholar and researcher of terrorism, took the problem a step further by incorporating various criteria in one concise definition: "a type of surreptitious warfare in which indiscriminate violence or threat of indiscriminate violence is used to induce fear for the purpose of changing the state of mind or policy of the nation or group whose members are intimidated" (2002:8). First, Grosscup branded terrorism a surreptitious warfare to distinguish it from conventional war which is defined as "a major armed conflict between nations or between organized parties within a state" (ibid.). Second, the reference to violence is because terrorism is projected as violence at its worst. Finally, terrorism spreads fear thereby reinforcing Crenshaw's concern that terrorism is "more a psychological than military strategy" (ibid.).

With all the criticism about the missing pieces in the definition of terrorism, Cunningham offers the following interpretation:

Terrorism is... the illegitimate use or threat of violence to further political objectives. It is illegitimate in that it targets civilians and/or non-combatants and it is perpetrated by clandestine agents of state and non-state actors in contravention of the laws of

war and criminal statutes. It is symbolic and premeditated violence whose purpose is to communicate a message to a wider population than the immediate victims of violence. It is designed to affect this audience by creating psychological states of fear in order to influence decision-makers to change policies, practices or systems that are related to the perpetrators' political objectives. These objectives can be either systemic or sub-systemic and may be motivated by complex social forces including, but not limited to, ideology, ethno-nationalism or religious extremism (2002:23).

Though Cunningham admits that his definition suffers from conceptual limitations as much as others we have offered so far in this section, it is very detailed and inclusive of many missing elements. It is actually the product of blending several academic definitions and adding a new perspective on the problem.

Despite all the definitions offered here, the problem of defining the nature of terrorism is yet to be resolved. It is time to end the debate and come to a multilateral agreement on what terrorism is. If researchers, scholars, governments, and policymakers agree on one single definition, imagine how less difficult it would be to develop appropriate global strategies to fight terrorism. We recommend that the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) create an international forum or convention for all the nations to come together and reach a mutually acceptable solution of what terrorism is. If nations continue to define terrorism on their own terms, they will fail in their strategies to fight it. We call on these two international institutions committed to world peace and security to take the lead in this effort and show us that terrorism is a global problem that requires global commitment to resolve, not by force but by constructive means.

The nature of apocalyptic terrorism

The definitional discussion above may suggest that we are playing here a "name game," one worthy of Foucault's claim that discourses are "constructed" in historically contingent time and privileged at the expense of other voices (e.g., Foucault, 1981). For example, why are the U.S. nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki or U.S./British firebombing of Dresden during World War II *not* acts of terrorism, while the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon are? Why is what Mel Gibson's character did to the British and what the British did to his forces in the film, "Patriot," not acts of terrorism but of guerrilla warfare and warfare, respectively?

Given that terrorists, guerrilla fighters, and soldiers kill people, including innocent civilians ("collateral damage") -- with soldiers killing more combatants and non-combatants than are killed by guerrillas and terrorists combined -- what can possibly be the difference between them? Is it the case that "terrorists" are people whose acts of violence we do not approve of, while guerrilla fighters and soldiers (especially our own) are people whose acts of violence we *do* approve of? Just witness the carnage in Israel and Occupied Palestine: from the perspective of President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, U.S.-supplied Apache helicopter gunship and F-16 jet fighter attacks by Israeli forces on a Palestinian refugee camp, in which civilians are killed in a crowded market place, are

acceptable acts of national defense, whereas a Palestinian teenager who blows herself up to kill the maximum number of Israelis on a crowded rush hour bus is a criminal, worse, a terrorist.

So, is something amiss here or are there meaningful differences between terrorists, guerrilla fighters, and military personnel? The short answer is, yes! Although there are significant exceptions -- certainly during recent and current U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq -- uniformed soldiers "aim" to kill other uniformed soldiers, guerrillas, and any one else who might be trying to kill them; guerrillas intend to kill political leaders and uniformed police and soldiers; and terrorists intend to kill anybody, especially easily accessed civilians ("soft targets").

Despite these differences, it is possible to have fighters from all three categories in the same "theatre of operations," with some activities clearly blurring the distinctions. For example, to revisit the discussion above, was the Holocaust an act of terrorism or an act of War against European Jewry? Does it matter? Or in Iraq, was the U.S.-led bombing of Baghdad and other parts of the "Cradle of Civilization" during March/April 2003 by 20,000 cruise missiles and other precision guided munitions, warfare or terrorism? For the surviving kin and neighbors of the 10,000 or more Iraqi dead, do the differences between "terrorism" and "war" matter? (See Conetta, 2003; Thomas & Brant, 2003:27). Although U.S. and British soldiers fought and "won" the three-week war against Iraqi troops, they are still involved in conducting military operations -- and dying in the process -- but against whom? Former Iraqi soldiers? Baathists? Disgruntled civilians? *Fedayeen*? Guerrillas? Or terrorists?

So, yes, there are differences, but once fighters enter into the "fog of war," those differences may cease to exist in any meaningful sense.

Where does this leave us with regard to the subject of this volume, *apocalyptic terrorism*? "Apocalyptic" connotes religion, the last book of the New Testament (i.e., the Book of Revelation), a final battle on Earth between [Christian] Good and [Satanic] Evil ("Armageddon"). One of the implications of "apocalyptic terrorism" is that acts of violence are expressed in a messianic struggle waged on a wide scale. Acts of "apocalyptic terrorism," therefore, are not necessarily confined within state boundaries. Benjamin Barber's *Jihad Versus McWorld* (1992), Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* (1993, 1996), and Mark Juergenmeyer's *Cosmic Warfare* (2000) come to mind here.

Accordingly, the "apocalyptic terrorist" would tend to be a non-state actor using, within the Westphalian system of international law, "illegal" means against symbolic and human representations of an enemy (e.g., the West in general, U.S. in particular), in order to defend his or her identity -- and "identity group" (see Burton, 1990, 1997) -- in global, religious, "civilizational," and/or ideological terms. As such, "apocalyptic terrorism" would seem to be qualitatively different from, say, the terrorism of the IRA to end the British presence in Northern Ireland; the terrorism of the African National Congress (ANC) to end *apartheid* in South Africa; and the hijackings by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 1970s and the suicide bombings by, among others, Hamas and Islamic Jihad during the second *Intifada* to end Israeli occupation of Palestine.

Apocalyptic terrorism need not necessarily be "catastrophic" (see Hamburg, 2002) or involve the voluntary death of the terrorist; but more and more, with the increased availability of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction (see Warrick,

2003), apocalyptic terrorism is likely to become more catastrophic and perforce, to involve the voluntary deaths of its perpetrators.

A question arising at this point is: what determines whether a person -- willing to commit acts of violence to achieve his or her goals -- becomes an apocalyptic terrorist willing to destroy him or herself in the execution of acts of catastrophic violence?

One answer is suggested by one interpretation of the great Abrahamic religion, *Islam*. It is clear that for many Arabs and Muslims worldwide, Islam is under siege by U.S.-directed globalization undergirded by a neo-“Crusader” mentality. This and the U.S. policy in the Middle East have encouraged some Arabs and Muslims to define Americans, Israelis, Jews, and Christians as the “Enemy” and, therefore, as targets of rage-based acts of violent defense of Islamic values.

A case in point is revealed by the 19 young men who committed the catastrophic acts of 11 September 2001, giving up their lives in the process. They were male, Arab, and *Wahhabist* (i.e., *Salafi*) Muslims. Wahhabism -- a more traditional, and for some, “purer” form of Islam -- is the brand of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia since the establishment in the 18th century of an alliance between the House of Saud and religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It is an indelible part of the Saudi state and consciousness. (Fifteen of the 19 terrorists were Saudi citizens.) More significantly, Wahhabism is also exported worldwide by the oil-rich state, with the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan being the most Wahhabist of all.

The main architect or inspiration for the 11 September attacks, Osama bin Laden, is not only a very wealthy Saudi and founder of the global terrorist group, *al Qaeda*, but also a Wahhabist. Since the 1990s, Bin Laden has issued *fatwa* -- religiously based edicts in effect declaring war -- against the U.S. and Americans for committing blasphemy against Islam by stationing in excess of 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia since the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Saudi Arabia is the site of two of the holiest shrines in Islam: Mecca, where The Prophet was born, and Medina, where The Prophet established the first Islamic state.

Osama bin Laden and others like him have additional grievances against the West: allowing Serbs to slaughter Bosnian Muslims with impunity during the genocidal implosion of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s; *carte blanche* U.S. support for nearly everything that Israel does to the Palestinians; U.S. support for corrupt regimes in the Arab world (e.g., in Egypt and Saudi Arabia); and the U.S.-led wars and military occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Until recently, there was not too much knowledge on the “Western street” about religion or the impact of religion in Saudi Arabia. What many people knew -- and still only know -- is that, in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia is a major source of oil for, and major ally of, the West, especially the U.S. People did not know, and still do not know, too much about Wahhabism. Only recently have we learned that, in Saudi Arabia:

... the demonizing of Christians, Jews and the West is pervasive in official books used throughout the government-controlled school system... A study, co-sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, of the Saudi Arabia Ministry of Education books used in grades 1 through 10 reveals that Saudi children are taught intolerance and contempt for the West, Christians and Jews in subjects ranging from literature to

math.

Children in the eighth grade learn in a geography book that "Islam replaced the former religions that preceded it" and that "a malicious Crusader-Jewish alliance is striving to eliminate Islam from all the continents." Christians and Jews are denounced as "infidels" and are presented as enemies of Islam and Muslims. Saudi schoolbooks implore Muslims not to befriend Christians or Jews, as in a ninth-grade jurisprudence schoolbook that states: "Emulation of the infidel leads to loving them, glorifying them and raising their status in the eyes of the Muslim, and that is forbidden."

Even grammar and math books are full of phrases exalting war, jihad and martyrdom. Saudi youth are educated to reject all notions of western democracy. Saudis are instructed that the West is a "decaying society" on its way to extinction (Harris, 2003. Also see PBS, 2001).

Powerful stuff! And we know the impact of our earliest learned "lessons," especially beliefs concerning those who have oppressed our identity groups for centuries. There are the "historical memories" -- what Vamik Volkan (1997) calls "chosen traumas" -- of, for instance, Serbs from the fall of Kosovo to Ottoman Turks on 28 June 1389; Greeks from the fall of Constantinople to Ottoman Turks on 29 May 1453; Irish Catholics from the defeat of the Catholic King James at the Battle of the Boyne by the Protestant King William of Orange on 12 July 1690; and Armenians from genocidal massacres perpetrated by Ottoman Turks which began on 24 April 1915.

There are also the "lessons of history" learned by many Muslims worldwide, especially from the Crusades launched against Islam by the Christian West nearly 1000 years ago. Into such an emotionally charged historical and *identity-based* setting has stepped an Islamic cleric whose fatwa may be having catastrophic consequences:

Intelligence officials are trying to gauge the reach and power of a cleric who has spent most of his time in London or "Londistan," as [U.S. officials] call the area around the Finsbury Park Mosque. A London imam, Abu Qatada, appears to European authorities to have had a role, possibly more inspirational than organizational, in any number of planned and accomplished catastrophes. According to a British dossier ... as far back as the mid-'90s, Abu Qatada issued a fatwa for the slaughter of women and children in Algeria by a radical organization called the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Jordanian authorities implicated Abu Qatada in the planned (but thwarted) Millennium attacks on American tourists. The imam was said by the French to have provided "spiritual advice" for terrorist plots in Strasbourg and Paris in 2000 and 2001, and 18 tapes of his sermons were found in the Hamburg apartment of Muhammad Atta, the lead hijacker on 9-11 (Isikoff, et. al., 2003:28-30).

It is not only religious identity and historical memory that may stir the passions, however. According to Shireen Hunter, "[m]ost Muslim societies have remained largely rural and traditional and hence more religion minded":

From a cultural perspective, most of the Islamic world is at the pre-industrial, even feudal, stage of development, when religion has a great hold on the society and the people (1998:166).

As such, there might be a greater tendency for people at this level of development -- and those who identify with them -- to feel empowered by the simplicity, clarity, and "purity" of Wahhabism, and therefore to comply with fatwa, even those issued by non-clerics such as Osama bin Laden, designed to enhance their sense of empowerment toward the hegemonic Western world.

As is clear from Stanley Milgram's (1974) experiments in *Obedience to Authority*, it does not take too much for obedience to be elicited by calls to violence, even in highly ad hoc, secular, Western settings. If such calls to violence are made to dispossessed, disempowered, marginalized people -- Fanon's (1968) *Wretched of the Earth* -- with an accompanying plea to voluntarily forfeit their lives in the process of striking back, they might be more likely to perpetrate acts of catastrophic, apocalyptic terrorism because of the profound sense of *meaning* associated with voluntarily giving up one's life to change the world, as the 19 young men so clearly did on 11 September 2001 (on *Man's Search for Meaning*, see Frankl, 1985).

How do Muslim clerics view such "life-forfeiting" actions? According to Joyce Davis (2003a), who has conducted interviews in the Middle East on this issue:

While Islam prohibits suicide, it is one's duty as a Muslim to fight evil and to defend the Islamic community [the *Umma*] and if all one has as a weapon in that struggle is one's body, then martyrdom is acceptable.

So, if one elects to die in the defense of one's identity group, instead of because one is "merely depressed," that is acceptable. And there are apparently many Muslims who at least support such selfless acts on behalf of the larger community. For example, according to the 2003 survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project:

The [U.S.] is losing a propaganda war for the hearts and minds of millions of Arabs spurred by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon, according to a survey released yesterday [3 June 2003].

The survey ... suggests that al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden inspires more confidence than President Bush across much of the Arab and Muslim world. It also shows a further slump in public perceptions of the [U.S.] over the past year around the globe, with favorable ratings down to as low as 1 percent in Jordan and the Palestinian territories.

"We have gone from bad to worse over the past year," said Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center, noting that hostility toward the [U.S.] has increased as a result of the invasion of Iraq. "We have been unable to make the case against bin Laden with Muslims because they see the [U.S.] as a threat" (Dobbs, 2003) (For the

Pew 2003 report, see: <<http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf>>).

In the Pew report for 2002:

Perhaps the most alarming finding is that a majority of respondents in Lebanon and Ivory Coast, and sizable minorities in Nigeria, Bangladesh, Jordan, Pakistan, and at least five other countries, say they believe that suicide bombing in defense of Islam is justifiable (AM, 2003) (For the Pew 2002 report, see: <<http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165>>).

Accordingly, many in the Arab and Muslim worlds seem to despise the West, particularly the perceived main driving force of Western culture and influence, the U.S. For those among them willing to commit catastrophic attacks against the U.S., if all they have in response to their rage are their own bodies as weapons in defense of Islam, then:

The war on terror will never be neat or clear-cut. Nor will it be short. "These people have a different sense of time," says a senior intelligence official. "They hark back to the Crusades. For them, the jihad is never-ending" (Isikoff, et al., 2003:31).

Hence, Joyce Davis' (2003a) characterization of the "apocalyptic" nature of this struggle as "a world war." Such a conceptualization of the fight against the "new terrorism" follows in part from the universalism inherent in Islam, plus the global nature of the perceived onslaught on traditionalism and, therefore, Islam. The *Umma* is now global!

So, when Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia express their concern for their "Muslim brothers" in Palestine and question the "double standards" implicit in the U.S. role in the Middle East, this is not a mere expression of ethnocentrism at the inter-group level, but an expression of the "civilizational rallying" that plays a major role in the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1993, 1996). Nevertheless, involved here is a "writ large" version of what we normally find in ethnocentric discourse and experience: a keen sense of "ingroup-outgroup" differences with a minority in-group, in this case Muslims worldwide, who feel that the Christian (now Judaic/Christian) Western out-group is pursuing a Crusade against them that goes back nearly 1000 years.

By implication, Western attacks on Muslims anywhere in the world are perceived by particular Muslims (e.g., in Malaysia and Indonesia) as attacks on them: a global, civilizational expression of the "circling of the wagons" phenomenon usually associated with the integrative functions of conflict at the inter-group level (see Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956). Such is the nature of the link between identity and apocalyptic terrorism that will be addressed more comprehensively in the final substantive section of this chapter.

When "God" explicitly enters the picture, we should not be too surprised at the consequences. In this regard, one Saudi, who uses a bit more than his body to commit catastrophic, apocalyptic violence at the interpersonal level, justifies it as follows:

Saudi Arabia's leading executioner, Muhammad Saad Al-Bashi, will behead up to seven people in a day. "It doesn't matter to me: Two, four, ten. As long as I'm doing God's will, it doesn't matter how many people I execute," he told [the Arabic-

language] *Okaz* newspaper in an interview...

He says he is calm at work because he is doing God's work...

He has executed numerous women without hesitation, he explains. "Despite the fact that I hate violence against women, when it comes to God's will, I have to carry it out" (Grove, 2003).

If Milgram's (1974) subjects felt that their "Obedience to Authority" was embedded in the authority structure of the experimenter, and if the Nazi perpetrators of the Holocaust felt that their genocidal behaviors were legitimated by the deeply rooted tradition of "following orders," then what can we possibly say about people who feel they are being called upon by God to commit acts of catastrophic, apocalyptic, "cosmic" violence?

"Why do they hate us?" is the question that motivated Joyce Davis (2003b) to write her recently published book, *Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East*. One answer is, quite simply, because the same types of people -- in terms of race and religion -- who launched the Crusades against Islam nearly 1000 years ago, are still perceived by Arabs and Muslims to be oppressing, marginalizing, and humiliating Islam: the U.S.-led wars and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq being the two most recent examples of "Crusader" efforts to keep Islam in a backward state of development.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that "Crusader" symbolism does not inhere only in Muslim historical experience. In part because of the "chosen trauma" phenomenon (Volkan, 1997) experienced regularly by Serb Orthodox Christians:

In July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces overran the predominately Muslim town [of Srebrenica], which had been declared a United Nations "safe area" under the protection of Dutch peacekeeping troops, and went on to kill up to 8,000 Muslims (IHT, 2003:2).

Ensuring that this event of 11 July 1995 -- "Europe's worst atrocity since World War II" -- would become a reinforced "chosen trauma" for Bosnia's Muslims (and Muslims worldwide), a "report by a Bosnian Serb government committee sparked outrage last year [2002] by suggesting that Muslims imagined or fabricated the massacre in Srebrenica" (ibid.).

Perhaps in response, "for the first time, a Bosnian Serb government delegation attended" the recent eighth anniversary of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre:

"I came here because I regard it to be my moral duty," said the Bosnian Serb prime minister, Dragan Mikerevic...

Mikerevic said his government was preparing a new report [on the massacre] but stopped short of saying the previous one was wrong (ibid.).

Accordingly, "chosen traumas," indelibly etched into the identities of Jews, Christians, and Muslims -- the three Abrahamic "People of the Book" -- continue to be

painfully experienced in "collapsed time" as a collective form of *post-traumatic stress syndrome*. There are profound implications here for conflicts in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Chechnya, and elsewhere, plus the global war on terrorism, the perceived "clash of civilizations" and "cosmic warfare" -- the levels at which apocalyptic terrorists are more and more likely to give up their own lives in the commission of acts of catastrophic violence, and perhaps in the process even see themselves (and be seen by others) to be doing "God's work."

Identity and its relationship with apocalyptic terrorism

What kind of a person could do such a thing? This is the question we hear Americans ask over and over again about the terrorists of 11 September 2001. The question is an important one, and we need to understand the answer and the role identity plays, if we are going to understand and prevent apocalyptic terrorism.

Why is identity important? All people have a basic human need for identity, recognition, and security. Although, "...their experience of fulfillment or violation of these needs may be different from one person to the next, depending on the cultural, religious, political, social, economic, and other 'identity groups' to which they belong..." (Sandole, 2002a:100).

More often than not, we define ourselves by first identifying what we are not and by distinguishing ourselves from others. Consequently, identity is shaped by the way we identify those members of the in-groups with whom we associate and the out-groups with whom we disassociate. Attachments to in-groups and preference of in-groups over out-groups are universal characteristics of human social life. These attachments and preferences result in a variety of in-group and out-group behaviors. The more negative behaviors include stereotyping, discrimination, prejudice, and violence (Brewer and Brown, 1998:558-559). As John L. Esposito, author of *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, explains:

The tendency to view the world in bipolar terms is a human propensity that has always utilized any difference in identity in the process of self-definition, social relations, and international affairs -- I belong to this family or village versus that family or village; I am secular versus religious; a believer versus a nonbeliever; capitalist versus communist; First World versus Third World. It is fed by a past tendency in our educational systems to either ignore other religious traditions and cultures or to treat them as mysterious, strange, foreign, inferior, or atavistic. As a result, both illiterate and highly educated people for different reasons are often ignorant of other traditions, more prone to view them in an 'us' and 'them' context, more likely to compare the ideals of their country, religion, or civilization with the negative realities of another. Moreover, as Huntington rightly notes, 'A world of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards: people apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others' (1999:231).

So, how does the way we identify ourselves and others result in violence? Dennis

Sandole explains that virulent ethnocentrism -- a deep and violently aggressive sense of the "other" -- derives from the "tendency of people across time and cultural space to subdivide others into 'them' and 'us'" (2002b:4). Virulent ethnocentrism tends to encourage social identity based conflicts to degenerate into genocide and causes them to be resistant to conflict resolution. Similarly, virulent ethnocentrism feeds apocalyptic terrorism and the clash of civilizations. Consider how some modern Islamic organizations and movements (including the *Muslim Brotherhood*, and *Jamaat-i-Islami*) view the West as the "historic and pervasive enemy of Islam and Muslim societies" on a political, religious, and cultural level -- a threat to the very identity and soul of Muslim societies (Esposito, 1999:129, 137-138). Similarly, the West "equates Islam with danger or threat when it views the Islamic world through slogans or epithets like 'militant Islam,' 'Islamic fundamentalism,' 'Islamic Terrorism,' and 'Islamic Bomb.'" Interestingly, neither side understands or appreciates how the other can view their side as the real threat (ibid., 217). Because both sides feel threatened (whether perceived or real), they have justified the use of violence as a means for defending themselves, their identity, and their very existence. This is a prime example of how the way we identify ourselves and others can lead to violence.

What causes people to experience such a deep and violently aggressive sense of others? If you dig deep enough, you will most likely find there is a history of trauma. "Chosen traumas bring with them powerful experiences of loss and feelings of humiliation, vengeance, and hatred that trigger a variety of unconscious defense mechanisms that attempt to reverse these experiences and feelings." Memories of tragedies and feelings about them are passed down to the descendants of the survivors, "as if later generations could carry out the mourning and adaptation that their ancestors could not" (Volkan, 1997:41). Sandole further explains how chosen trauma affects identity:

Clearly, "chosen traumas" (as well as "chosen glories") can become part of the "heavy hand of the past" determining one's identity which, together with a hypothesized "need for an enemy" (Volkan, 1985, 1988), bifurcate the world into in-groups ("us") and out-groups ("them"), with "them" being the ones who violated "us" at some point in time, or at frequent points in time, the likelihood being that they will do so again (see Montville, 1993) (2002b:18).

People who have been brutalized by an experience that continues to define who they are, their perceptions and behavior, are, in a way, 'possessed' by that chosen trauma which resides at the affective [reptilian/limbic] level; yet, on the other hand, those of us who attempt to be helpful are dealing with them at the cognitive [neocortical] level (ibid., 9).

Unfortunately, this means that we are not using the right tools to resolve the problem. First, we cannot realistically expect individuals who are deeply traumatized to look at things rationally or logically, without first dealing with the underlying emotions and trauma. Second, we must realize that logic and rationality are shifting paradigms. In other words, what is perceived as rational or logical is "in the eye of the beholder" and changes over time. The bottom line: we need to respond to the underlying emotions and trauma that are driving the behavior with approaches such as trauma counseling, relationship and trust

building.

“Situations that put basic human needs in jeopardy often lie at the root of many different human conflicts -- interpersonal, organizational, or international” (Hamburg, 2002:121). There are environmental as well as biological factors that contribute to the likelihood of violence when basic human needs are threatened:

During periods of threatened or actual violations of an actor’s basic needs for, among others, recognition, identity, and security, which may reflect territoriality, elements of [a] physiological mechanism (specifically, the limbic system) may come to dominate the actor’s neocortical rationality, increasing the probability of a violent response to the perceived source (or a surrogate of the source) of the frustrated needs (Sandole, 1998:12).

Perceived or actual threats to an individual’s need for identity (and consequently security) will eventually lead to anger or fear. Anger and fear have the potential to lead to violence. Anger induced by frustration is the motivating force that disposes some people to aggression. Fear, induced by a perceived threat to life, may also result in aggression. Frustration-aggression and threat-aggression provide the basic motivational link between relative deprivation and the potential for collective violence (Gurr, 1970:25, 35-37). Relative deprivation is the perceived breakdown between value expectations and value capabilities (Gurr, 1970:24). According to the relative deprivation theory, violence is a form of aggression stemming from frustration, which results from wanting something and not getting it. The potential for relative deprivation to result in collective violence depends on the scope and intensity to which it exists. The scope of relative deprivation is its prevalence with respect to each class of values among the members of a collectivity. The intensity of relative deprivation is the extent of dissatisfaction or anger that is associated with its perception (Gurr, 1970:29). The greater the distance between value expectations and value capabilities, the more likely it is that people in conflict will experience frustration and/or insecurity. The more frustrated or insecure people feel, the more likely it is that the conflict will result in violence.

More often than not, people who experience intense frustration and insecurity enough to hold a deep and violently aggressive sense of others are living in politically unstable and economically fragile societies. Unfortunately, political and military leaders will play on group identities and frustrations to build enemy images in an effort to redirect internal dissent away from them and onto others. This type of behavior is also categorized as “misattributed conflicts” or “induced conflicts,” which is “what political leaders in distress sometimes do in order to remain in power: create conflicts with others as a way to redirect internal dissent away from them and onto those others” (Sandole, 1998:9). In other words, political, military, and economic leaders may purposely divert the frustration of their citizens toward out-groups, to avoid revolt by lower castes and classes within their own countries. As a result, conflicts with the out-group become functional -- they serve a purpose beyond the stated issues. Consider the environment in which Hitler succeeded in building enemy images of Jewish people, blaming the Jews for the economic despair that consumed Germany at the time.

Violence stemming from a need for identity may be a difficult concept for most

Americans to comprehend, for a number of reasons. Until 11 September 2001, most of us had not experienced the level of fear that people living in the Third World and war-torn societies experience every day. We do not see our neighbors, young women, children, and family members tortured, raped, murdered, or starving day in and day out. Most of us have not suffered from the extreme poverty that plagues Third World countries. In fact, we do everything we can to avoid seeing the poverty suffered by our brothers and sisters struggling to survive in inner city ghettos, homeless shelters, or on Indian reservations.

In addition, many Americans have not had their identities formed by the chosen traumas suffered by their ancestors. Of course there are exceptions, particularly among American Indians, African-Americans, Japanese-Americans, or Jewish-Americans.

Few Americans have a deeply rooted, historical sense of identity. For those of us whose ancestors willingly chose to move to this country, they moved to start a new life. Many adopted new identities, changed their names (often to avoid discrimination in hiring or housing practices), and who you were became less important than who you were going to become. Consequently, most Americans identify themselves more by what they do for a living than by their religious, national, or political identity. In fact, the most common question asked in America when you meet someone new is: "So what do you do for a living?" We place great emphasis on the need for a professional identity at a very young age. We often ask young children, "What do you want to be when you grow up?" What we do for a living is a large part of how we define who we are, and it is how we identify ourselves to others. Because this professional identity changes from time to time, it is fairly fluid, somewhat negotiable, and is not deeply rooted. As a result, few Americans have a deeply rooted, historical sense of identity.

While many of us hold deep religious beliefs and values, our religious identity is something we have been conditioned to suppress. Generally speaking, it is considered impolite in our society to talk about religion (or politics for that matter) in most social settings. One possible explanation for this behavior is the diversity of religious beliefs held in this country. In addition, it is not uncommon for Americans to struggle to reconcile their more liberal social and political ideals with the conservative ideals encouraged by their church communities. Another explanation may be the fact that we live in a secular society, which has chosen to separate the roles of church and state. The very first amendment to the Constitution of the United States (included in the Bill of Rights) is Freedom of Religion. Interestingly, many of us living in secular societies view the mixing of religious beliefs and politics as irrational, dangerous, and extremist. We forget that our notion of separation of church and state is relatively new. Historically the mixing of the two has existed for a variety of religious groups including Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (Esposito, 1999:258).

In addition, the vast majority of Americans who do not serve our country seldom think about their national identity, unless of course it is threatened or attacked. A sense of national identity is far more prevalent for those Americans who do serve in the military or in public service. The harsh reality of living in an individualistic society is that most of us in America are consumed with our own needs, values, and survival. We seldom think about the needs of a larger group, beyond our immediate families. Very few Americans put the needs of their community (whether religious, ethnic, geographic, or national) above their own individual needs. Again, there are exceptions. For example, those who serve in our military have put the collective needs of their national community above their own personal

needs. They are, after all, willing to die for us.

Because most Americans' identities are individualistic, diverse, fluid, negotiable, and at times conflicting, it can be difficult for Americans to understand how an individual's need for identity or loyalty to an identity group could drive him or her to strike out in violence -- or worse yet -- strap on explosives and blow himself or herself up. It is important for Americans to realize that not all identities are shaped in the same way. A wide range of life experiences and conditions shapes individual and group identities. In some cultures, the need for identity is more closely related to security issues. The brother of a young female suicide bomber explains:

A person is willing to die for his cause if it's a question of his very existence...

Americans don't have that problem. They don't have to fight for their existence, and maybe that's why they don't understand or don't accept the concept of martyrdom (See Davis, 2003b:70).

For Islamic political activists, Islam is a total or comprehensive way of life as stipulated in the *Quran*. Islam is not simply an ideology, but a theological and political mandate. Those within Islamic society who do not adhere to this mandate are no longer viewed as being Muslim. Rather, they are rejected as being atheists, unbelievers, and enemies of God, against whom true Muslims must wage *jihad* (holy war) (Esposito, 1999:16-17). In other words, in many Islamic societies maintaining a common identity is the key to survival. Simply put, if you are branded an enemy of God, you will be killed. Young Americans who become members of gangs or those who become involved in or are born into organized crime families may very well face the same identity-based security dilemma.

If the need for identity and security is motivating apocalyptic terrorism, what can we do to address the problem? If Americans are going to be successful in preventing apocalyptic terrorism, we must recognize and respect how the need for identity can be linked to security issues and the need to survive. We must understand how our own stereotyping, prejudice and discriminatory behaviors reinforce past trauma and increase the likelihood of fear-based aggression, which in turn results in a self-fulfilling prophecy. "[T]o fully understand the reality of the threat facing Americans, it is important not to be lulled into racist and misleading stereotypes that can thwart real attempts to prevent a repetition of the horror of September 11" (Davis, 2003b:22).

Government leaders and the media must be educated about the dangers of building enemy images. They must work diligently to break down the stereotypes they have so actively fostered. Over and over again, our leaders and media brand those who act out in violence as religious extremists, cults, the "axis of evil," or violent fundamentalists. They forget that:

Many people -- believers and nonbelievers, Muslims and Jews, Christians, Sikhs, and Hindus -- become enraged when their survival or interests are threatened. And Muslims are not the only people who use religion to rationalize and legitimate actions. In reality, most "civilized" peoples, normally compassionate and kind, accept rage against evil and hatred of enemies as a normal response toward heinous

crimes, wartime enemies, hostage taking, or terrorism (Esposito, 1999:227).

With the “War on Terrorism,” the American media and political and military officials have been so successful at generating enemy images of Islam, that many Muslim people equate the war with a “War on Islam” while Americans equate terrorism with the Muslim culture. Most Americans, including ourselves, are surprised to learn that not all suicide bombers are Muslim. In fact, a young Christian woman named Loula Abboud fought Israelis in Lebanon and was among the first suicide bombers in the Middle East. We forget that Christians have slaughtered thousands of Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo. “[T]he stories of David Koresh in Waco, Texas, and of the Reverend Jim Jones of the Jonestown tragedy, provide clear examples of how Christianity, like any religion, can be contorted to lay the foundation for fanaticism and virtual insanity” (Davis, 2003b:16, 24).

Contrary to popular belief, Americans are not the only ones trying to combat terrorism. Millions of Muslims around the world are working to end the association of Islam with violence and terror. Unfortunately, their message is not reported in western media, because it does not provide “high drama” for headlines. “Peace mongers simply do not make news.” All too often the American media compromises accurate and balanced reporting for sensational headlines (ibid., 200). The same is true for media in other countries. This is part of the problem in need of a solution if we are going to prevent apocalyptic terrorism.

Most importantly, if we are to prevent future acts of terrorism, we must deal with the underlying causes and conditions: past trauma, poverty, insecurity, political instability, and functional spillover. Undeniably, “the kind of human suffering rampant in the Middle East is a breeding ground for hatred and anger” (ibid., 22). Unfortunately, F-16s, nuclear warheads, sanctions, and embargos only serve to generate more fear, distrust, and poverty, thereby increasing the likelihood of violence. For this reason, military means alone will not effectively combat terrorism. Underlying issues must be addressed. As Davis so eloquently stated, “The only way to tackle terrorism... is to make life more attractive to prospective *shuhada* than death -- to give them more reasons to live than to die” (ibid., 16).

If we are going to make life more attractive than death, then economic relief and development aid are needed to combat poverty. However, relief and development should not come with strings attached. Nor should we impose our own values and ideals during this endeavor as with globalization, westernization, and modernization.

In addition, education and skill building are needed both within and outside our borders. We need to build opportunities for positive exposure among individuals from clashing cultures to help dispel stereotypes and enemy images. We need to provide trauma counseling. We must identify opportunities to work with those outside our borders to build more collaborative and secure futures. All of these elements are important, if we are going to prevent apocalyptic terrorism.

Due to the fear and distrust of western civilizations among many Muslims, the resolution of underlying causes and conditions will be more sustainable if the solutions come from within. Therefore, American military and government officials must collaborate with moderates from within those societies where terrorists surface. As Davis notes:

Only respected, moderate Muslims can speak to the young men and women who

make up the backbone of the radical movements in order to stop their flight into the ranks of the *jihadees* as an outlet for their rage. These youths need to be convinced of the truth of another Islam. They need to be convinced of Islam's preference for peace. Moderate Islamists are also essential in helping the United States improve its standing in the Muslim world and refute the widespread belief, promoted by the militants, that the U.S. war on terrorism is really a war on Islam (ibid., 196).

If we are to be successful, we must show respect for other cultures, values, and norms. We must collaborate with a wide range of cultures as we seek preventive solutions to apocalyptic terrorism. We must recognize that the "Western way" is not the only way to build a strong economy or a secure society. In other words, we must empower vulnerable populations to tailor programs and approaches for combating poverty, insecurity, and political instability in ways that truly meet their needs.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have addressed the nature of terrorism, apocalyptic terrorism, and the nexus between identity and apocalyptic terrorism. We conclude that identity is but one of many factors we must consider when dealing with causes and conditions that contribute to terrorism. Combined with political, economic, and social factors, the need for identity contributes to the complexity of the problem. Rather than analyze the need for identity in isolation, we encourage the reader to apply complexity theory by looking at the big picture and avoiding the analysis of causes and conditions in a vacuum. Complexity theory helps conflict resolution practitioners identify, analyze, and address multiple causes of a conflict, the interaction and interdependence of causes and conditions, and the various levels at which they exist and interact. Complexity theory also helps practitioners understand that the causal role of identity in shaping terrorism, and apocalyptic terrorism in particular, is inseparable from other factors. "[E]verything is connected to everything else," including "nature and nurture" (Sandole, 1998:12) (Citing Waldrop, 1992).

Ultimately, the global war on terrorism must be waged at the level of dealing effectively with the deep-rooted underlying causes and conditions of the conflicts that some decide to pursue via catastrophic, apocalyptic violent means. If we fail (or refuse) to resolve the underlying causes and conditions, we will suffer a life sentence of victimization and violence -- consigned to deal with never-ending symptoms in ways that only serve to feed and sustain the deep-rooted causes and conditions: clearly, not a rational way to "win" the global war on terror.

In closing, we caution our readers that the examples we brought in to the chapter should, by no means, lead one to believe that terrorism is the exclusivity of the Muslim and Arab World. We raise these examples because these are the cases currently in the forefront -- on the minds of many people, media, government and military leaders in the United States. Insecurity, fear, and frustration that breed terrorism are widespread. They can create strong roots and flourish in any nation given the right conditions. We encourage our readers to broaden their interest beyond the Middle East and to consider the sub-Saharan region in Africa, Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan), the Balkans, and even our own country as potential breeding grounds for

apocalyptic terrorism.

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